



On track competition in passenger rail: British experience

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1. Introduction
2. British approach to rail reform
3. Open access experience to date
4. Competition and Market Authority Proposals
5. Conclusions




- No remaining state owned operator – all operations privatised
- All passenger services franchised, whether profitable or not
- 20 franchises
- Strong independent regulator (ORR)

Rail passenger km in Great Britain 1996-2014



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b pass km





- Economic growth? But scarcely affected by recession
- Reduced competition from road
 - Slow growth of car ownership
 - Congestion worsening road journey times
 - Rising petrol costs
- Reduced rail fares, improved rail services and better marketing

Passenger railway costs per train km (2011/2 prices) (£b)



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	1996/7	2005/6	2011/2
• Total	20.2	27.0	25.4
• Infrastructure	9.2	14.4	13.9
• Operations.	11.0	12.6	11.5

See Smith and Nash (2014)



- Evidence that British franchises are typically too big
Wheat and Smith (2015)
- Problems in managing franchise failure
- Some costs such as fuel cost, insurance and policing have risen a lot
- Big rise in staff costs partly due to competition for scarce skilled staff?
- Lack of alignment of incentives between infrastructure and operations
(McNulty)
- Transfer of employment – existing staff salaries and conditions protected
- Might more open access competition help control costs?

Current position on open access



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- Office for Rail Regulation considers applications for track access
- Open Access Rights only granted if:
 - Not Primarily Abstractive
 - Newly generated business is at least 30% of revenue abstracted from existing operators
 - Capacity exists
 - Often conflicts between applications – several applications at the same time (including from the incumbent!)
 - Social Cost Benefit Analysis used to inform the decision

Open Access Competition- British East Coast Mainline



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- Principal trunk route from London to Leeds, York, Newcastle and Edinburgh
- First new entrant, Hull Trains, running London – Hull calling at Doncaster (7 per day)
- Second new entrant, Grand Central, running London - Sunderland (near Newcastle) calling at York (5 per day)
- Grand Central then expanded to run London- Bradford (near Leeds) (5 per day)



West Coast Main Line

-LNWR 5 trains per day London – Blackpool
(currently only 1)

East Coast Main Line

First 5 trains per day London – Edinburgh
(Low cost standard class only no frills)

Rejected

GNER Hourly London – Edinburgh

Hourly London – Leeds/Cleethorpes



Off peak Fares to/from London

		Open access reduction
Hull Trains	Hull	18%
	Doncaster	18%
	Grantham	11%
Grand Central	Sunderland	32%
	York	27%

(Source: Griffiths, 2009)

Comparison of ECML stations with and without competition 2007-8 to 2011-2



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	With	Without
% change in		
Traffic	42	27
Revenue	57	48
Mean fare	11	17

Source: AECOM



- **Lower fares**
- **Additional services to new destinations**
- **Use of spare capacity**

BUT ALSO

- **Reduced profitability of the franchisee (leading ultimately to less income for the government)**
- **Poorer use of scarce capacity**
- **Less well integrated timetables**

What has happened to costs?



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- Rail operations have substantial economies of density
- small Open Access (OA) TOCs should have high unit costs
- But cost per train hour not very different to franchised operators:
- something must be outweighing lack of economies of density
 - Lower input prices (staff costs per employee 10% less)
 - Shorter trains and cheaper rolling stock
 - Benefit from sharing resources with parent group (e.g. train maintenance)
 - But still seems to be a further 'business model' effect offsetting cost of low density
 - Is this related to the Transfer of Employment conditions that apply to franchised operators?

Would benefits in terms of costs persist if greatly expanded?

The Competition and Market Authority report 2016



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- Option 1: An increased role for open access on intercity routes
- Option 2: Two operators per current franchise who would compete against each other
- Option 3: Redesign of franchise map to design in more overlapping franchises
- Option 4: Licensing multiple operators (Auctioning? With PSO obligations? With a secondary market for trade in PSO paths)

What would be the impact on costs?



- Open access operators only pay variable track access charges (total from all operators £2.4b)
- Franchised operators also pay a fixed charge (£2.5b)
- Profitable franchises also pay a premium (£1.9b)
- Therefore need to:
 - reform track access charges (high charge per train km?)
 - charge a public service obligation levy (per passenger km)

CMA's evaluation



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	1 – Greater Open Access	2 – Split franchises	3 – Overlapping franchises	4 – Licence system	0 – Base case
Passenger and efficiency benefits	✓✓✓	✓✓	✓	✓✓✓✓	-
Funding and risk	x	x	-	x	-
Considerations within the network, including operational issues	✓	-	-	✓	-
Wider social/ economic benefits	✓✓	✓✓	✓	✓✓✓	-
Implementation ease	xx	x	x	xxx	-

CMA (2016)



- **More open access competition might benefit users (price competition; quality of service)**
- **But changes to track access charges and PSO levy might lead to cuts in services**
- **Less well integrated timetables and poorer use of scarce capacity**
- **What would happen to costs?**
 - **loss of economies of density**
 - **would open access operators keep their other cost advantages if major expansion?**
 - **would transfer of employment rules apply?**

Is a better way forward to improve the franchising process?



- The Competition and Markets Authority's (CMA's) Project on Rail Competition can be found here:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/competition-in-passenger-rail-services-in-great-britain>